Let us now consider the impact that adopting these naturally formed beliefs would have on Hume’s causal theory. We can either have a Cartesian clear and distinct idea, or we can have a supposition, that is, a vague, incomplete, or "relative" notion. They only claim that we have no clear and distinct idea of power, or that what is clearly and distinctly conceived is merely constant conjunction. While it may be true that Hume is trying to explicate the content of the idea of causation by tracing its constituent impressions, this does not guarantee that there is a coherent idea, especially when Hume makes occasional claims that we have no idea of power, and so forth. First, the realist interpretation will hold that claims in which Hume states that we have no idea of power, and so forth, are claims about conceiving of causation. Thus, it is the idea of causation that interests Hume.

However, if the previous distinction is correct, then Hume has already exhaustively explicated the impressions that give content to our idea of causation. The challenge seems to amount to this: Even if the previous distinction is correct, and Hume is talking about what we can know but not necessarily what is, the causal realist holds that substantive causal connections exist beyond constant conjunction. I shouldn't. I'm homely and awkward and odd and old, and you'd be ashamed of me, and we should quarrel--we can't help it even now, you see-and I shouldn't like elegant society and you would, and you'd hate my scribbling, and I couldn't get on without it, and we should be unhappy, and wish we hadn't done it, and everything would be horrid! Clatterbaugh takes an even stronger position than Blackburn, positing that for Hume to talk of efficacious secret powers would be literally to talk nonsense, and would force us to disregard Hume’s own epistemic framework, (Clatterbaugh 1999: 204) while Ott similarly argues that the inability to give content to causal terms means Hume cannot meaningfully affirm or deny causation.

It seems that Hume has to commit himself to the position that there is no clear idea of causation beyond the proffered reduction. The realist seems to require some Humean device that would imply that this position is epistemically tenable, that our notion of causation can reasonably go beyond the content identified by the arguments leading to the two definitions of causation and provide a robust notion that can defeat the Problem of Induction. This is the very same content that leads to the two definitions. The general proposal is that we can and do have two different levels of clarity when contemplating a particular notion. It is here that the causal realist will appeal to the other two interpretive tools, viz. The realist Hume says that there is causation beyond constant conjunction, thereby attributing him a positive ontological commitment, whereas his own skeptical arguments against speculative metaphysics rejecting parity between ideas and objects should, at best, only imply agnosticism about the existence of robust causal powers. After engaging the non-rational belief mechanism responsible for our belief in body, he goes on to argue, "Belief in causal action is, Hume argues, equally natural and indispensable; and he freely recognizes the existence of ‘secret’ causes, acting independently of experience." (Kemp Smith 2005: 88) He connects these causal beliefs to the unknown causes that Hume tells us are "original qualities in human nature." (T 1.1.4.6; SBN 13) Kemp Smith therefore holds that Humean doxastic naturalism is sufficient for Humean causal realism.

Generally, the appeal is to Hume’s texts suggesting he embraces some sort of non-rational mechanism by which such beliefs are formed and/or justified, such as his purported solution to the Problem of Induction. The other role is to answer the skeptical challenges raised by the "traditional interpretation" of the Problem of Induction. Further, it smoothes over worries about consistency arising from the fact that Hume seemingly undercuts all rational belief in causation, but then merrily shrugs off the Problem and continues to invoke causal reasoning throughout his writings. Further, given Hume’s skeptical attitude toward speculative metaphysics, it seems unlikely that he would commit the Epistemic Fallacy and allow the inference from "x is all we can know of y" to "x constitutes the real, mind-independent essence of y," as some (though not all) reductionist accounts would require. It accomplishes the latter by emphasizing what the argument concludes, namely that inductive reasoning is groundless, that there is no rational basis for inductive inference. It would provide a way to justify causal beliefs despite the fact that said beliefs appear to be without rational grounds. John Riches proposes that teaching Ricochet, croquet without the croquet strokes, is a fast and fun way for beginners to be introduced to the full game.

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